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5.1  Introduction 
In the event of  a property-casualty (P&C) insurance company failure, the 
losses suffered by the insured are protected by  state guarantee funds (or sol- 
vency funds). Guarantee funds pay the claims of policyholders of the failed 
firm, making up any shortfall between the failed firm’s assets and the cost of 
these claims by levying assessments on the premiums collected by solvent in- 
surers in that state. In recent years state guarantee funds have come under in- 
creasing pressure as more P&C insurance companies failed. As shown in figure 
5.1, both the nupber of  insolvencies and the costs to state guarantee funds 
have  increased sharply since the mid-1980s. In  1993, the net costs to state 
guarantee funds was a record high of $800 million. 
Some have argued that the dramatic increase in the number of insolvencies 
in the mid-1980s was caused by price cutting by liability insurers during the 
early 1980s (U.S. Congress 1990). In addition, some observers have noted a 
marked increase in the expected value and variance of claims cost distributions 
at this time (Clarke et al. 1988).  Regardless of the reason for the wave of insol- 
vencies, P&C insurance companies and policymakers have been concerned 
about the rising level of  the assessments and the potential for much higher 
assessments should there be an even larger wave of insolvencies. 
These facts raise a series of important issues about the solvency fund system, 
many of  which have not been addressed in the academic literature. First, to 
what extent does the solvency fund system create perverse incentives? Because 
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Fig. 5.1  Guarantee fund activity 
Sources: NCIGF and A. M. Best Company (various years). 
healthy firms are required to make (indirect) payments to the claimants of in- 
solvent firms, the P&C solvency fund system is like a tax and social insurance 
system. The mandatory nature of the assessments means that they can be viewed 
as a tax on healthy firms. The assessments (taxes), which are not risk rated, are 
the price that companies are forced to pay in order to purchase second-level in- 
surance against the possibility of failure and the inability to pay claims. 
In addition to any distortions created by mandatory assessmentshxes, this 
social insurance scheme may create substantial  moral hazard problems. This is 
particularly true for insurance companies that are insolvent or near insolvent. 
Such companies have the same incentive problems (“heads I win, tails some- 
body else loses”) that were faced by the savings and loans (S&Ls). Cash-poor 
and near-bankrupt  P&C companies have the incentive to undercut competitors’ 
prices, write more (potentially risky) policies, and increase cash flow, just as 
S&Ls had the incentive to offer attractive deposit rates in order to increase 
deposits and make risky loans. Note that this moral hazard problem would be 
mitigated or even eliminated if  P&C companies paid assessments that were 
related to their riskiness. The difficulty, of course, is determining how to mea- 
sure their riskiness. 
A second important issue concerns the exposure of the solvency fund sys- 
tem. That is, how “exposed” are state guarantee funds to various shocks (e.g., 
natural disasters) that cause insolvencies? What scenarios would cause sol- 
vency fund assessments to reach their maximum level (typically 1  or 2 percent 
of premiums per year)? How exposed is the system to a very large shock or set 
of  shocks that would create an S&L-like problem in the P&C insurance in- 
dustry? 
The first step toward answering any of these questions is to understand the 
magnitude, nature, and determinants of the costs of resolving P&C insolvenc- 141  The Costs of  Insurance Company Failures 
ies. The adequacy of guarantee funds depends on both the number of insolven- 
cies and the net costs to the fund per insolvency. For the most part, previous 
studies of insolvencies in the P&C industry have involved estimating hazard 
models to predict the number or likelihood of  insolvencies. In contrast, we 
focus on the cost dimension of P&C company insolvencies. 
We  have several major goals in this study. First, we estimate the total net 
costs of resolving insurance company insolvencies. While a number of studies 
have estimated insolvency costs for the banking industry, there have been no 
studies that have produced such an estimate for insurance companies. Second, 
since resolution of a given insolvency typically takes many years, we estimate 
the typical time path of the guarantee payments (and net costs) and analyze 
how these time paths differ with the composition of the firm’s book of business. 
Third, we examine the determinants  of the size of losses associated with insur- 
ance company insolvencies. 
The results of  our analysis should be of practical importance to regulators 
who seek to design prudent safeguards against insurance company failures. A 
better understanding of the magnitude and determinants of the costs of resolv- 
ing insurance company failures will allow more informed regulation of insurer 
solvency. Research in this area is particularly necessary in light of the current 
interest in restructuring the guarantee fund system.’ 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the organization and 
administration of  the guarantee fund system. In section 5.3 we describe the 
data and produce estimates of the time path of resolution costs. In section 5.4 
we use these time paths to produce estimates of the costs to the solvency funds 
of an “average” insolvency. In section 5.5 we regress insolvency costs on vari- 
ous firm characteristics to examine the determinants of insolvency costs. We 
discuss potential reasons for our finding that insolvency costs are quite high in 
section 5.6. Section 5.7 concludes. 
5.2  The Guarantee Fund System: Background 
In this section, we provide background information on the organization and 
administration  of the guarantee fund system.2  The current guarantee fund sys- 
tem was a response to a federal initiative in the late 1960s to establish a guaran- 
tee system for insurance that would function like the FDIC. As a result of the 
1. There have been a number of  recent proposals to reform the guarantee system. Hiestand 
(1986) discusses in depth problems that arise due to administration  of solvency funds at the state 
level. In 1992, the NAIC’s Focus Group issued a report calling for a uniform national receivership 
system. Alternative proposals include Hall and Hall’s (1993) proposal to develop an insurer-run 
guarantee system and Schacht and Gallanis’s (1993) modification of the current system to facilitate 
greater interstate cooperation. There is also ongoing interest in designing a system of risk-based 
assessments on premiums (see Cummins 1988). Risk-based capital guidelines have recently been 
adopted in some states. 
2. Much of the discussion  in the section is drawn from Epton and Bixby (1976), Duncan (1987), 
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threat of federal intrusion into an industry theretofore regulated by the states, 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) proposed model 
legislation for the establishment  of guarantee funds at the state level. By 1971, 
35 states had adopted guarantee fund provisions based on the NAIC’s model 
act, and by 1982,  every state had adopted some form of guarantee fund legisla- 
tion. In most cases, the organization  of the fund closely resembles that outlined 
in the model act. 
The model act calls for the formation of a not-for-profit association con- 
sisting of all companies licensed to write insurance within a state in lines cov- 
ered by the guarantee fund. Membership in the association is compulsory. The 
association is an entity distinct from the state insurance department. It is gov- 
erned by a board composed of representatives of member firms and the state 
insurance commissioner’s office. When a company becomes insolvent, the 
guarantee fund services and pays the claims of policyholders of the failed in- 
surer in the same way that payments would be provided by a solvent insurance 
company. Each state’s guarantee fund pays only for the claims of the insured 
residing in that state. Thus, the failure of a multistate insurer triggers action on 
the part of several guarantee associations. 
Guarantee funds typically pay the full amount of an insured‘s claims up to a 
certain cap, except for a small ded~ctible.~  Any shortfall between the assets of 
the failed insurer and the obligations of the fund is covered by levying assess- 
ments against healthy firms doing business in the same state as the insolvent 
firm. Assessments of  member firms are directly proportional to their shares 
of direct premiums written within a state in lines covered by the fund.4  Thus 
assessments are not based on any measure of risk. Assessments are also made 
to cover the administrative, legal, and other expenses associated with the oper- 
ation of the state guarantee funds. Thus the total costs of resolving insolvencies 
include the administrative costs of managing the guarantee funds. 
In 49 states, funds operate on a postassessment basis. The funds maintain 
no reserves and only assess member insurers after an insolvency  occur^.^ As- 
sessments are typically capped at 2 percent of premiums written, although 
some states maintain lower caps. All states have some provision that enables 
companies to partially offset amounts assessed by  the fund. In most states, 
insurers are allowed to include the cost of assessments as a factor in determin- 
ing premiums. Some states allow insurers to recover a portion of their assess- 
3. The caps on the funds’ liability per claim are typically $300,000  to $500,000. Some states 
maintain caps as low as $l00,OOO. As a practical consideration, the upper limits are high enough 
that they are rarely binding in the claims administration process. Deductibles range from nothing 
to $200; however, most funds have a deductible of $100. 
4. Guarantee funds are typically organized into separate accounts covering broad lines of insur- 
ance. The most common form of organization has three separate accounts-workers’  compensa- 
tion, automobile, and “all other” types of  insurance. However, different states operate as few as 
one or as many as six accounts. 
5.  The exception is New York State, which adopted guarantee fund legislation in 1947. Unlike 
other funds, New York’s operates on a preassessment basis. The state maintains a fund of $150 to 
$200 million for the resolution of insurance failures. Firms writing insurance in the state are as- 
sessed whenever the fund balance falls below the lower bound. 143  The Costs of Insurance Company Failures 
ments with credits against their premium tax liability, which shifts a portion of 
the costs of the insolvency to the state. 
Guarantee funds are not responsible for the detection or prevention of  in- 
surer insolvencies. The typical sequence of events in an insurance insolvency 
begins with the filing of a petition in state court by the insurance commissioner 
in the company’s state of domicile. If the court finds the insurer to be insolvent, 
insurance regulators  take over the management of the firm. In most cases, regu- 
lators begin to liquidate the assets of the failed insurer and turn the file con- 
taining the claims over to the managers of the guarantee fund. The guarantee 
fund pays the claims of the insureds from the assessments levied on healthy 
insurers and the proceeds of the sale of assets of the failed insurer. Since poli- 
cyholders cannot be paid by the guarantee fund before an order of liquidation 
has been approved by the court, regulators typically file a petition to liquidate 
the firm soon after the company has been found to be insolvent. Action by the 
guarantee fund is terminated once all claims against the estate of  the failed 
insurer have been paid. This may take over a decade if  the failed firm was 
involved in liability or compensation insurance? 
5.3  The Time Path of Resolution Costs 
In the next section, we use data obtained from the National Conference of 
Insurance Guarantee Funds (NCIGF) to estimate the net costs to guarantee 
funds per insolvency. However, because the amount of time it takes to resolve 
an insolvency is typically long, we first estimate the typical time paths of these 
costs and analyze how  these time paths differ with the composition of  the 
failed insurer’s business. Although our time-path estimates may be of indepen- 
dent interest to regulators, our main reason for analyzing the time paths is 
because it is a necessary first step (as will be explained later) to estimating 
total costs per insolvency. 
Guarantee payments are the sum of all expenditures by the guarantee fund, 
including legal costs, operating expenses, and paid claims to those who were 
insured by the insolvent company. It should be emphasized that these payments 
are costs to the fund over and above the proceeds from the liquidation of assets 
of the insolvent company. On occasion, the fund receives cash inflows, called 
recoveries, from the (typically late) liquidation of assets of the failed company. 
Net costs to the fund are the difference between fund payments and recoveries. 
5.3.1  Data Description 
Our initial list of insolvencies was obtained from the 1992  and 1993  editions 
of the NCIGF’s Assessment and Financial Information Report (1992, 1993b), 
which provides annual and cumulative payments, recoveries, and net cost data 
6. Alternatively, the regulator may  take actions to restore the financial health of  the insolvent 
insurer. These rehabilitations  are quite rare. Failures have been successfully resolved by rehabilita- 
tion in about a dozen cases (NCIGF 1993b). 144  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
for all insolvencies that necessitated guarantee fund payments. The NCIGF’s 
1993 report provided this data for 356 firms. Action on the part of guarantee 
funds is triggered by an order to liquidate the failed insurer. We searched Best5 
Insurance Reports (A. M. Best Company, various years), Best5 Solvency Study 
(A. M. Best Company 1991), and documents provided by the NCIGF to deter- 
mine the liquidation date and the date that each insurer became insolvent. We 
were able to determine the date of  liquidation of  328 (92 percent) of  these 
firms. The 28 firms for which liquidation dates were unavailable were very 
small. Collectively, they accounted for less than 1 percent of total fund pay- 
ments. Data on annual fund payments and net costs (payments minus recover- 
ies) for each firm were obtained from the 1992 and 1993  issues of the NCIGF’s 
annual report. Due to differences in reporting practices, comparable annual 
data at the firm level were not available prior to 1992. 
Financial data for each firm were obtained from the NAIC’s Annual State- 
ment Database. Financial data on the firm were drawn from the annual state- 
ment filed by the firm in the year before the firm became insolvent. We  omit 
firms that were inactive or in runoff by excluding firms with direct premium 
writings less than or equal to zero. A firm was also excluded from our sample 
if we could not determine the year in which the firm became insolvent.  Because 
machine-readable  financial statement data are not available prior to 1984, we 
confined our analysis to the set of  firms that were liquidated in the period 
between 1986 and 1993. Of the 214 liquidations involving fund activity in that 
period, we were able to obtain complete financial information on 141 firms (66 
percent of the total). Firms included in the sample accounted for 80 percent of 
fund payments. We made an adjustment for inflation using the CPI so that all 
financial statement information and fund activity data are in real 1993 dollars. 
Since New York is the lone preassessment solvency fund and is not included 
in the NCIGF data, we do not include New York in our sample. For firms that 
operate in multiple states that include New York, we scaled the size (measured 
by assets) of these firms down by the percentage of premiums written in New 
Y~rk.~  Our results are not sensitive to our scaling procedure. 
5.3.2  The Time Path of Payments and Costs 
Because of typically long resolution times, the majority of P&C insolvenc- 
ies were not fully resolved as of  1993. Our approach, therefore, is to estimate 
“typical” paths of costs and then use these paths, along with the data that we 
do have on to-date cumulative  costs, to determine the total costs for each (typi- 
cally unresolved) insolvency. We  used the annual payment and cost data from 
1992 and 1993 so that each insolvency produced two observations in our data 
set. Time period t = 1 is defined as the year the liquidation order was issued. 
7. There was one firm  that operated entirely within New York State in the year prior to insol- 
vency. However, it had written a small amount of business outside of  New York in previous years, 
and thus its failure prompted a small amount of fund payments. We dropped this firm  from our 
sample. The percentage of premiums written in New York State averaged only 2 percent in the 
remaining companies. 145  The Costs of Insurance Company Failures 
For example, if a firm was liquidated in 1989, the 1993 payments and net costs 
would form an observation in the t = 5 cohort while the 1992 results would be 
an observation in the t = 4 cohort. We  begin with the year of liquidation be- 
cause guarantee funds typically do not make payments to claimants until an 
order of liquidation has been obtained. We  estimated the following equation, 
which we will refer to as specification 1 : 
Payments,, = p,  * Premiums,  + E, , 
for each of  the eight cohorts (t = 1, . . . ,  8). Paymentsi, is payments by  the 
guarantee funds to policyholders of firm i in year t, and Premiumsifo  is direct 
premiums written by firm i in the year prior to insolvency, to.  Thus, eight sepa- 
rate regressions were run. 
We start with payments as the regressor rather than net costs because recov- 
eries occur in large lump sums and net costs may therefore be more prone to 
outliers.8  As will be shown later, however, the paths using payments and net 
costs are qualitatively similar (and net costs are always lower since recoveries 
are subtracted), although as expected the  estimated paths of  net costs are 
slightly less smooth. 
In table 5.1, we report the results of this regression. The specification has a 
nice interpretation.  Each coefficient indicates the amount of payments in year 
t that is associated with another dollar of premiums written in the year prior 
to insolvency (to).  We  suppress the constant terms since they were typically 
insignificant and because excluding them allows the coefficients to be more 
easily interpreted. We  estimate the coefficients to year 8 only because of the 
data limitations suggested earlier. 
Note that all of the coefficients are highly significant. They imply that every 
dollar in total premiums written in the year previous to insolvency is associated 
with payments to the guarantee funds of  about 25 cents in year 1 (the year of 
liquidation), 27 cents in year 2, 14 cents in year 3, and so on, to only 4 cents 
in year 8. The typical pattern of payments increases slightly between year  1 
and year 2 and then falls, fairly smoothly, until it drops to a very small amount 
in year 8. It also seems clear that the vast majority of payments occur in the 
first two or three years following a liquidation. 
Note also that the coefficients add to about 0.89, which implies that each 
dollar of premiums written is associated with, on average, 89 cents of payments 
made by  the state guarantee funds in the first eight years  We  discuss 
total payments, and net costs, in subsection 5.3.3. 
8. We  reestimated all of the models in this section after trimming outliers from the data set. Our 
criterion for determining whether an observation was abnormally influential was based on the ratio 
of the determinant of the covariance matrix in the full sample to the determinant of the covariance 
matrix when an observation was deleted from the data set. This method and the suggested critical 
values are discussed in Besley, Kuh,  and Welsch (1980). The deletion of abnormally influential 
observations did not substantively alter the results. 
9. This number is consistent with the  very high estimates of ratios of costs to  assets that  we 
report in the next section. 146  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
Table 5.1  Time Path of Guarantee Fund Payments 
Year  Premiums  Adjusted RZ  N 
1 
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Notes: Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard errors. Payments,, = P,* 
+ E,,  where i = firm  index  (i = 1, . . . ,  TI), t = year relative to liquidation date 
(t = 1, . . . ,  8), and to = year prior to insolvency. Models were estimated separately for each t. 
Liquidation proceedings commence in year t = 1. 
As a check on the implied time-path pattern, we regressed payments in 1993 
on payments in 1992 for each liquidation (specification 2). Since firms were 
liquidated in different years, this enables us to determine the relationship be- 
tween costs in year t and costs in year t -  1 for various years since liquidation. 
The results are shown in table 5.2. They point to the same basic pattern. Costs 
are about 1.25 times higher in year 2 than in year 1 but then decline relative to 
the previous year in each year thereafter. 
Both specifications imply a particular pattern of payments over time. The 
only tricky issue is what to assume about the payments in the years beyond 
year 8. Fortunately, the results from the first specification (payments regressed 
on premiums) suggest that the payments in year 8 are relatively small. Barring 
some unusual pattern beyond year 8, it seems likely that the out-year payments 
are not large. We  produce “terminal value costs,” which we define as the sum 
of total costs beyond year 8, by averaging the “rate of decline” (which is im- 
plied in the first specification and explicitly estimated in the second specifica- 
tion) for years 2 through 8.’O  We then assume that this rate of decline is constant 
10. The rates of change between year 1 and year 2 are unlikely to tell us much about the rate of 
decline in the years after year 8. 147  The Costs of Insurance Company Failures 
Table 5.2  Alternative Estimate of the Time Path of Guarantee Fund Payments 
Year  Payments,  Adjusted RZ  N 
1 
2  1.2454  ,7411  43 
3  .5743  .9679  26 
4  .4887  3911  24 
5  ,8742  .9385  29 
6  .6259  ,8777  18 
7  ,7920  ,9552  14 
8  .7282  ,9032  23 
-  -  - 
(.3457) 
(.02  14) 
(.0674) 
(.0911) 
(. 11  92) 
(.0891) 
(.0552) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Payments,,  = 
p,* Payments,,  + E,,, where i = firm index (i = 1, . . . ,  n)  and t = year relative to liquidation date 
(t = 1, . . . ,8). Models were estimated separately for each t. Liquidation proceedings commence 
inyeart= 1. 
for all years beyond year 8 and assume that payments increase forever at this 
declining rate. It turns out that for both specifications 1 and 2, the terminal 
value costs are small-11  and 5 percent of total payments, respectively." 
Table 5.3 andiigure 5.2 show the implicit paths of these payments over time. 
For each model, and for each year, the percentages of cumulative payments are 
reported (i.e., the amount of payments made in that year as a fraction of implied 
total payments to resolve the insolvency). What is striking about the results is 
the similarity between the paths. In both cases, about one-quarter of total pay- 
ments is made in year 1, slightly more than half by year 2, about two-thirds by 
year 3, and three-quarters by year 4. 
We  now turn to estimating the time path of costs. Following our first speci- 
fication for payments, we estimated 
Net costs,, = p,  * Premiums,,  + E,, , 
11. Terminal values were calculated under the assumption that payments and net costs would 
continue to decrease at the same rate experienced in years 2 through 8. In the first specification 
we calculated the rate of decrease, r, and terminal value as: 
r  = (pyJpYdy,  Terminal value  =  pvew8  *  r/(l - r) . 
Since our estimate of p,,,  is somewhat imprecise, we calculate the rate of decline using the aver- 
age of  p,,,  p,,,  and p,.,  In the second specification,  the rate of decrease was the average of 
p,,,  through p,,.  The terrmnal value was calculated the same way as in specification 1. 148  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
Table 5.3  Comparison of Time Paths of Guarantee Fund Payments Implied by 
Tables 5.1 and  5.2 
Cumulative Percentagea 
From Tota!  From Regression on 
Premiums Regression  Previous Payments 
Year  (Specification 1)  (Specification 2) 
1  25.2  23.3 
2  52.3  52.2 
3  65.9  68.8 
4  71.7  77.0 
5  73.3  84.1 
6  79.4  88.5 
7  85.4  92.0 
8  89.0  94.6 
aPayments made by  the end of year n as a percentage of implied total payments made to resolve 
the insolvency. 
1  "t  s  0.8 
r  UJ  a  0.6 
r;  0.2 
0 
1  2 I  3 I  4 I  5 
Year  I  6 
7  8 
I  Total Premiums (Spec. 1)  0  Lagged Payments (Spec. 2) 
Fig. 5.2  Implied path of cumulative payments 
for each of  the eight cohorts (t  = 1, . . . ,  8). The results of these eight regres- 
sions are shown in table 5.4. The results show the same basic pattern as the 
payments regression. The coefficient on total premiums is slightly larger in 
year 2 than year 1 and then declines thereafter.  As suggested earlier, the declin- 
ing pattern is less smooth because in some cases large lump-sum recoveries 
from the estate of  the failed insurer may  be realized late in  the liquidation 
process. This probably accounts for the negative, but insignificant, coefficient 
in year 6. For the most part, the other coefficients are statistically significant 
and sensible; the coefficients on net costs are almost uniformly slightly smaller 
than the coefficients on payments, which makes sense since recoveries are al- 
ways positive and net costs equal payments minus recoveries. Note also that 149  The Costs of Insurance Company Failures 
Table 5.4  Time Path of Net Resolution Costs 










Sum of coefficients 
for years 1-8 
Year 9 and after 





















,0732  51 
.3524  51 
,8589  30 
,3410  34 
.4186  34 
-.0178  22 
.7563  23 
,3233  23 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard errors. Net cost,, = p,* 
+ E~,,  where  i  = firm index (i = 1, .  . . ,  n), t = year relative to liquidation date 
(t = 1,. . . ,8), and to = year prior to insolvency. Models were estimated separately for each i. 
Liquidation proceedings commence in year f = 1. 
the sum of the coefficients for the eight years is equal to 0.75, which implies 
that each dollar of premiums written in the year before insolvency is associated 
with costs to the guarantee fund of 75  cents in the first eight years. The equiva- 
lent figure for payments was 89 cents. 
Using the same procedure as before, we construct the time path for net costs. 
This time path is shown in table 5.5 and figure 5.3, with the payment path also 
shown for comparison. The time paths of payments and net costs are similar, 
the only difference being that an even larger fraction of total costs occurs in 
the first few years. For example, by the end of year 4, about 82 percent of net 
costs are paid compared to about 72  percent for total payments. The faster 
pattern for net costs reflects the fact that recoveries tend to come later than 
payments. The clear pattern that emerges from the data is that for both pay- 
ments and net costs, the vast majority of costs to solvency funds occur during 
the first few years following liquidation. 
5.3.3  The Time Path of Costs: Long-Tail versus Short-Tail Lines 
In this section, we estimate the time paths for payments and net costs and 
focus on how these costs vary with the types of  lines that firms write. For 
example, we expect that firms that write significant amounts of  premiums in 150  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
Table 5.5  Comparison of Time Paths of Guarantee Fund Net Resolution Costs 
and Payments 
Cumulative Percentagen 
Year  Net Costs  Payments 
1  30.3  25.2 
2  62.0  52.3 
3  77.4  65.9 
4  81.7  71.7 
5  83.1  73.3 
6  81.7  79.4 
7  87.8  85.4 
8  90.9  89.0 
“Costs/payments incurredlmade by the end of year n as a percentage of  implied total costs/pay- 
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Fig. 5.3  Implied path of cumulative payments and net cost: regression of 
annual payments or costs on total premiums 
long-tail lines such as liability coverage and workers’ compensation will take 
longer to resolve than firms that write premiums predominantly in short-tail 
lines. 
We run regressions of the type in specification 1 above, the only difference 
being that we  divide premiums into two categories-long-tail  lines and all 
“other.” The lines that are placed into the long category are workers’ compen- 
sation, medical malpractice, products liability, and other liability. All other 
lines are put into the “other” category.’*  Long-tail lines accounted for 36 per- 
cent of total premiums written by firms in our sample. Therefore, we estimate 
12. We thank Sean Mooney for helpful discussion on the relative lengths of lines. 151  The Costs of Insurance Company Failures 
Table 5.6A  Time Path of Guarantee Fund Payments as a Function of Failed 
Firm Business Mix 
Year  Long Tail  All Other  Adjusted R2  N 
1  .3675  .2219  .0557  51 
2  .2501  .3103  .3344  51 
3  .I569  .0987  .9457  30 
4  .0834  .0536  .6133  35 
5  .0182  .0161  .4959  35 
6  .0955  ,0168  3925  23 
7  ,0736  ,0423  ,8189  23 
8  ,1192  .0044  ,7764  23 
Sum of coefficients 
(S969)  (. 1199) 
(.O 106)  (. 12  15) 
(.0083)  (.O 102) 
(.0315)  (.0223) 
(.0069)  (.0050) 
(.0072)  (.0103) 
(.0117)  (.0268) 
(.0426)  (.0112) 
for years 1-8  1.1644  .7641 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard errors. Payments, = a,* 
Longcb  + p,*  Other,,o + E,,, where i = firm  index (i = 1, . . . ,  n), r = year relative to liquidation 
date (t = 1, .  . . ,  8), and to = year prior to insolvency. Models were estimated separately for each 
t. Liquidation proceedings commence in year t = 1. 
Payments,  = a, * Otheqro  + pr * Longiro  + E,, , 
for each of the eight cohorts. 
The results are shown in table 5.6A. The coefficients on long-tail premiums 
are generally larger and decrease at a slower rate. The slower decline in the 
coefficients of  long-tail lines is exactly what was expected. Firms that write 
premiums in long-tail lines take longer to resolve than firms that write premi- 
ums predominantly in short-tail  lines. In terms of differences in total payments, 
the sum of the coefficients is also larger for the long-tail lines. If  we use the 
same methodology as before to calculate the terminal value payments (the im- 
plied sum of payments in year 9 and after), the total payments in long-tail lines 
are approximately twice as large as those in other lines, as indicated by the 
ratio of  1.55 to 0.80 (the last entries of the first two columns) in table 5.6B. 
One possible reason why long-tail lines might be associated with higher 
total costs is that longer tail lines have higher costs in the future that have not 
been discounted.  The data do not support this notion. In order to check for this 
possibility, we  discounted the future payments with a real interest rate of  3 
percent.I3  The results are shown in the third and  fourth columns of table 5.6B. 
13. We chose this rate because it is slightly higher than the average real rate of 2.5 percent on 
Treasury bills during the past 10 years, the time period of our data. 152  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
Table 5.6B  Expected Guarantee Fund Payments per Dollar of Direct 
Premiums Written 
Present Discounted Value of 
Payments Assuming a 3.00% 
Real Interest Rate  Total Payments in 1993 Dollars 
Years  Long-Tail Lines  All Other  Long-Tail Lines  All Other 
Years 1-8  1.1644  0.7641  1.0900  0.7330 
Year 9 and after  0.3896  0.0369  0.2710  0.0282 
Total  1.5440  0.8010  1.3610  0.7613 
Table 5.7A  Time Path of Guarantee Fund Net Resolution Costs as a Function of 
Failed Firm Business Mix 
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Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard errors. Net cost,, = a,* 
Other  + @Long.  + E,,, where i  = firm  index (i = 1, . . . ,  n), t = year relative to liquidation 
“0  “0  date (t = 1, . . . ,  8), and to = year prior to insolvency. Models were estimated separately for each 
f. Liquidation proceedings commence in year t = 1. 
Note that the discounted coefficients imply that total payments per dollar of 
premiums in long-tail lines (1.36) are still almost twice as high as total pay- 
ments associated with other lines (0.76). 
The same results with net costs substituted for payments are reported in 
tables 5.7A and 5.7B.  The results are quite similar and consistent with expecta- 
tions. Total costs associated with long-tail lines are again larger than those 
associated with short-tail lines; in fact, total net costs per dollar of premiums 153  The Costs of Insurance  Company Failures 
Table 5.7B  Expected Resolution Costs per Dollar of Direct Premiums Written 
Present Discounted Value of 
Payments Assuming a 3.00% 
Real Interest Rate  Total Payments in  1993 Dollars 
Years  Long-Tail Lines  All Other  Long-Tail Lines  All Other 
Years  1-8  1.0576  0.6032  0.9970  0.5915 
Year 9 and after  0.5028  0  0.3426  0 
Total  1.5604  0.6032  1.3396  0.5915 
Table 5.8  Percentage of Total Guarantee Fund Payments Made through the 
End of Year t 
Cumulative Percentage" 
Long-Tail  All Other 
Year  Lines  Lines 
1  23.68  27.10 
2  39.79  66.44 
3  49.90  78.76 
4  55.28  85.46 
5  56.46  87.47 
6  62.61  89.56 
7  67.22  94.84 
8  74.90  95.39 
"Payments  made by the end of yearn as a percentage of implied total payments to resolve the insol- 
vency. 
in long-tail lines are more than twice as large as net costs in short-tail lines, 
both when costs are in 1993 dollars and when costs are discounted by the real 
interest rate. Again, the coefficients imply a more gradually declining path for 
long-tail lines than for other lines. Note that there are two negative coefficients 
(in years 6 and 8) in the other premium category. Though these coefficients are 
not statistically significant, it is possible for them to be negative since recover- 
ies may exceed costs on average in out years. 
The implied time patterns for payments associated with short- and long-tail 
lines are shown in table 5.8 and figure 5.4, and the analogous patterns for net 
costs are shown in table 5.9 and figure 5.5. Again, the striking feature about 
the estimated time paths is the large divergence between the time path in long- 
tail lines and that in all other lines. For long-tail lines, less than two-thirds of 
payments are made within the first six years. The similar figure for other lines 
is about 90 percent. For net costs, the difference in time patterns is even more 
striking. Only 54 percent of  net costs in long-tail lines occur in the first six 
years. The analogous figure is 101 percent in all other lines. Again, it is pos- 
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Fig. 5.4  Implied path of cumulative payments: regression of annual payments 
on premiums in long-tail and other lines 
Table 5.9  Percentage of Total Net Resolution Costs Incurred through the End 
of Year t 
Cumulative Percentage’ 
Long-Tail  All Other 

















“Costs incurred by the end of year n as a percentage of  implied total costs of  resolving the insol- 
vency. 
percentage that can exceed 100 percent) if recoveries exceed payments on aver- 
age during a particular out year. The cumulative percentages should be viewed 
as rough averages since they are produced by regression coefficients, a few of 
which are imprecisely estimated. Nevertheless, we are comforted by the fact 
that the implied patterns of net costs in short- and long-tail lines are sensible 
and consistent with the patterns of payments. The important and robust result 
is that the costs associated with long-tail lines have a more slowly declining 
time path and represent higher total costs per dollar of premium. 155  The Costs of Insurance Company Failures 
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Implied path of cumulative resolution costs: regression of annual net 
cost on premiums in long-tail and other lines 
5.4  Estimates of Costs per Insolvency 
We now use our estimates of the time paths of net costs to produce estimates 
of  the total costs for each insolvency. We  start with the cumulative net costs 
for each insolvency, which we have obtained from the NCIGF. The estimated 
coefficients from the relevant time-path regressions (from table 5.7A) along 
with each firm’s  specific percentages in each of the two premium categories 
(long and other) imply a unique time path for each insolvency. We  use this 
time path, along with the number of  years since liquidation, to estimate the 
percentage of net costs that have already been incurred for a firm with a certain 
set of  characteristic^.^^ We then combine this information with the cumulative 
payments to create a projection of total net costs. Note that to keep multiplica- 
tive factors small, we compute projected net costs only for firms that were 
liquidated at least two full years prior to the last year of our data, 1993.15  That 
is, we wanted to limit the amount of  “projection error” by ensuring that add- 
on net costs for the companies are small relative to already incurred net costs. 
The companies in this trimmed sample of  87 firms had mean assets of  $57 
million, mean premiums of  $46 million, and mean surplus (i.e., capital) of 
$6.5 million. 
A hypothetical example should help clarify our procedure for estimating net 
payments and costs. Assume that cumulative payments at the end of  1993 for 
a firm that was liquidated five years ago is $100. We use the regression coeffi- 
14. As mentioned earlier, all costs and payments are in 1993 dollars. 
15. We identified 137 liquidations involving guarantee fund action occumng between 1986 and 
1991. Financial information in the year prior to insolvency was available on the NAIC Annual 
Statement Database for 87 of these firms. These 87 firms represented 76 percent of the net costs 
incurred to date for firms liquidated between 1986 and 1991. 156  James G.  Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
cients in table 5.7A and the fact that the firm’s premium mix was 30 percent 
long and 70 percent other to determine that after five years, cumulative pay- 
ments are typically 92 percent of the total for a firm of this type. This implies 
a multiplicative factor of  1.09 (1 divided by .92), which is used to project total 
net costs of $109 for this firm. 
As a check on our results, we also used a second procedure for producing 
payment and cost projections from cumulative costs. With this “additive” pro- 
cedure, we sum the regression coefficients by line for the remaining years and 
multiply each sum by  the dollar amount of premiums written prior to insol- 
vency. This adjustment factor, used to account for future costs to the fund, is 
added to 1993  cumulative payments or net costs.“j  This second, additive proce- 
dure produced estimated net costs that are very similar to those from the multi- 
plicative procedure.” 
In table 5.10, we report some summary statistics of net costs relative to 
assets.18 The first row shows, for all firms in our sample, the mean ratio of net 
costs to assets, with both the multiplicative and the additive scaling methods. 
These means indicate that the total cost of  resolving firms is approximately 
100 percent of the value of their assets (measured in the year before they fail), 
a remarkably large number. This implies that the true value of companies’ lia- 
bilities are twice the value of their assets when they fail. In a later section, we 
show that the high ratio of insolvency costs to assets is the result of increasing 
liabilities (which were underestimated) rather than decreasing assets. 
In the next four rows, ratios of  net costs to assets are reported for sets of 
firms subdivided by  asset size. The smallest firms tend to have higher costs 
than the larger firms, but no general pattern exists for the three largest quanti- 
ties. In the last three rows, we divide firms according to their fraction of premi- 
ums in long-tail lines. The results show-not  surprisingly, given our earlier 
findings-that  those firms with significant amounts of  premiums written in 
long-tail lines are more costly to resolve. In fact, the net costs of the firms in 
the top third of this category are approximately twice as costly as those in the 
bottom third. We come back to this issue in section 5.5. 
The key finding, however, is that it is very costly to resolve the failures of 
P&C insurance companies. Net costs as a fraction of assets appear to be nearly 
100 percent of assets, which we note is more than three times larger than the 
30 percent estimate for commercial banks and S&Ls (Barth, Bartholemew, and 
Bradley 1990;  Bovenzi and Murton 1988; James 1991).  We discuss the validity 
16. The multiplicative procedure is more appropriate if firms with abnormally large or  small 
payments in the early stages of liquidation also experience abnormally large or small costs in the 
later stages. The additive adjustment procedure is more appropriate if deviations from the normal 
path in the later stages are uncorrelated with deviations in the early stages. 
17. In section 5.5 the  “failcost” regressions are estimated with both methods for estimating 
payments and costs. Not surprisingly, the results are very similar. 
18. The results are qualitatively similar if we scale by total premiums rather than by  assets. We 
scaled by assets because, as will be  argued later, they are less prone to change sharply in the year(s) 
before insolvency. 157  The Costs of  Insurance Company Failures 
Table 5.10  Mean Value of Net Costs as a Percentage of Assets 
Sample 
Costs/Assets 
Number  Multiplicative  Additive 
of Firms  Mean'  Scaling  Scaling 
All firms  87  1.024  1.032 
Company asset size 
1 Smallest  21  2.9  2.127  2.078 
2  22  13.0  ,773  .797 
3  22  32.4  .558  ,550 
4 Largest  22  176.6  .690  ,748 
1 Lowest fraction  29  .Ooo  ,752  .754 
2  29  .048  1.031  1.046 
3 Highest fraction  29  .698  1.290  1.296 
Fraction of premiums in long-tail lines 
"Mean assets (in millions) or mean fraction of premiums in long-tail lines. 
of compNsons between ratios of resolution costs to assets for insurance com- 
panies and for banks in section 5.6. 
5.5  The Determinants of Insolvency Costs 
In this section, we seek to determine what are the key, measurable determi- 
nants of the size of resolution costs. We  use our projections of net costs from 
section 5.4 as a measure of  the actual net costs of  resolving P&C company 
failures. Our approach, which follows that of James's  (1991) and Bovenzi and 
Murton's (1988) studies of the costs of bank failures, is to regress net resolution 
costs, scaled by total assets, on a vector of variables assumed to affect resolu- 
tion costs. 
The first variable that we include as a regressor is the fraction of premiums 
written in long-tail lines (FRACLONG). We already have established that the 
longer tail lines have longer resolution times and higher net costs on average. 
Here, we seek to determine whether the costs are also higher, controlling for a 
variety of factors. 
Next, we include the ratio of book value of capital (surplus) to assets (CAP- 
RATIO). The coefficient on the ratio of book value of capital (surplus) to assets 
of the insurer allows us some insight into the magnitude of unrealized losses 
in the insurer's assets and its book of business. We  expect a higher level of 
(preinsolvency) reported capital to be associated with a lower cost of  insol- 
vency, ceteris paribus. If, however, the reported surplus is an unreliable mea- 
sure of  true capital-because,  for example, insurers systematically overstate 
the true value of their assets or understate the true level of future losses to avoid 
regulatory intervention-then  there may not be a strong negative relationship 
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that James (1991) found this coefficient to be positive in his study of the costs 
of bank failures, which he interpreted to be the result of fraudulent reporting 
of capital. 
We also consider how the reason for insolvency affects net costs. We supple- 
mented our data set with information from the A. M. Best Company (1991) 
insolvency study on the cause of insurer failures. The Best study included most 
of the firms in our study and assigned each insolvency to one of nine categories 
for the cause of failure. We  include dummy variables for failures deemed by 
Best to be caused by FRAUD (= 1) or DISASTER (= 1). 
We also include several variables that may be correlated with large resolu- 
tion costs. The first is high premium growth in the year preceding insolvency. 
As stated in the introduction, the moral hazard problem may be particularly 
acute for firms on the brink of bankruptcy. Such firms may undercut their com- 
petitors by offering low prices to write a large volume of premiums. For this 
reason, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the company’s premium 
growth is in the top quartile of  all firms. We  measure premium growth two 
different ways: by growth in total premiums written and in earned premiums 
(an income statement item). 
We also include two measures of asset composition that may be correlated 
with resolution costs. First, it is often thought that firms that own a large 
amount of real estate have riskier asset portfolios. Although the average propor- 
tion of real estate held by P&C insurance companies is quite small (3.7 percent 
of assets), we include the fraction of assets in real estate on the right-hand side 
as a crude measure of the riskiness of P&C asset portfolios. We  include the 
ratio of cash plus short-term investments to liabilities as a measure of the firm’s 
ability to meet obligations to policyholders in the preinsolvency period. 
In addition, high growth in losses may be associated with unusually high 
costs for the obvious reason that losses erode capital. In theory, this effect 
should be picked up by the capital ratio. However, high loss growth may also 
reflect the fact that such firms are engaging in unusually risky behavior that 
will lead to higher resolution costs. Thus we include a dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm’s loss growth is in the top quartile of all firms. Analogous 
to our measures of  fast premium growth, we measure losses in two ways: 
total losses (from the balance sheet) and incurred losses (from the income 
statement). 
Finally, we control for company size. The summary statistics on net costs 
from table 5.10 indicate that smaller firms have higher net resolution costs (as 
a fraction of total assets). We therefore include dummy variables, equal to one 
for each quartile of firms ranked by total assets, as right-hand-side variables. 
The results of these regressions, with various permutations of  right-hand- 
side variables, are shown in tables 5.11A and 5.11B as models 1-6.  Hetero- 
scedasticity-consistent standard  errors  (White  1980)  are  in  parentheses. 
FFUCLONG, the fraction of premiums written in long-tail lines, is positive 159  The Costs of Insurance Company Failures 
Table 5.11A  Determinants of the Costs Resolving Insurer Failures 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard errors (White 1980).  The 
dependent variable, FAILCOST, is the ratio of  total resolution costs after scaling to preinsolvency 
assets of  the failed insurer. 
and approximately twice as large as its standard error in all six models. This is 
consistent with our earlier finding that firms with a high FRACLONG have 
higher net costs on average. 
While it is easy to see why firms with a high fraction of premiums in long- 
tail lines have longer resolution times, it does not follow that such firms also 
have higher average resolution costs. While it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to investigate why this is the case, one intriguing possibility is a type of moral 
hazard induced by  the solvency fund system: insolvent (and near-insolvent) 
companies may game the system before they are closed down by the regulators 
by writing premiums, perhaps at prices below expected costs, in long-tail lines. 
From the insurance company’s perspective, the benefit of this policy is an im- 
mediate inflow of  cash, which enables the company to stay in business and 
to continue to pay salaries, a potentially important consideration to well-paid 
managers and executives of the companies. The costs of this policy to the in- 
surance company are deferred and indefinite payments to claimants. Of course, 160  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
Table 5.11B  Determinants  of the Costs of Resolving Insurer Failures 
Model 6 with  Model 6 with 
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-  ,049  1 
(.0258) 
-  ,9477 
(.5243) 
-  1.3677 
(.5649) 
-  1.5979 
(.7631) 
(.3947) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980).  The 
dependent variable, FAILCOST, is the ratio of total resolution costs after scaling to preinsolvency 
assets of the failed insurer. 
this gaming of the system is only possible if the regulators are either unable or 
unwilling to see through this game and to take quick action to close down the 
company when such gaming is detected. 
In contrast to the finding of James with regard to commercial banks, we find 
a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the capital ratio (CAP- 
RATIO), suggesting that measured capital has at least a positive correlation 
with actual capital, which provides a buffer to losses and should lead, ceteris 
paribus, to lower levels of  net costs to solvency funds. Taken together, our 
estimated coefficients indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the capital 
ratio decreases the ratio of payments to assets by about 0.6 percentage points. 
In terms of the A. M. Best rating variables, FRAUD does not seem to have 
any explanatory power on net costs. The coefficient on DISASTER, however, 
is large, positive, and statistically significant. The data suggest that disasters 
are associated with very large costs to the guarantee funds. They suggest that 
if the reason for the insolvency is a disaster, the ratio of costs to assets increases 161  The Costs of  Insurance Company Failures 
more than fivefold, ceteris paribus. Firms failing because of  disasters were 
small and geographically concentrated. The lack of diversification may have 
been induced by moral hazard. When the disaster struck, the firms experienced 
a dramatic upward revision in their losses. This finding may suggest that the 
costs of resolving firms that failed because of a disaster are so large that these 
firms should be treated differently. As a quick check on this possibility, we 
removed firms that failed because of disasters from our sample. However, re- 
moval of these firms did not change our results in a substantive way. 
The coefficients on fast total premium growth (model 2) and fast earned 
premium growth (model 3) are positive as was hypothesized. However, neither 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level. The co- 
efficients on fast total loss growth (model 4) and fast incurred loss growth 
(model 5)  are both positive as was hypothesized, and the former is significant 
at the 5 percent confidence level, indicating that firms that have large losses in 
the year before insolvency tend to be associated with large costs to the sol- 
vency funds. Neither of the asset composition variables (model 6) are statisti- 
cally significant, although the coefficient on the proportion of real estate in the 
asset portfolio is positive and slightly larger than its standard error. Given the 
relatively bland nature of the typical asset portfolio of P&C insurance compa- 
nies, this result is not that surprising. 
The coefficients on the size dummies suggest, as was found earlier, that 
larger firms tend to have lower cost ratios than smaller firms. This may reflect 
some economies of scale in the process of liquidating the firm and administer- 
ing its claim file. Alternatively, it may be that larger firms, because of their 
potential for sizable costs to the guarantee funds, are forced into liquidation 
faster or are more closely monitored by regulators prior to insolvency. For the 
same reason, large firms may be monitored more closely during the insolvency 
and liquidation proceedings. 
In table 5.11B we estimate model 6 with two modifications in order to test 
our basic results for robustne~s.'~  First, we  use the additive rather than the 
multiplicative procedure for determining net costs, as discussed in section 5.4. 
Second, we replace net costs expressed in real 1993 dollars with net costs ex- 
pressed in present discounted value terms, using the same 3 percent (real) dis- 
count rate as before. The results are robust to both of these modifications; none 
of  our results are substantively different from our earlier results. Taken  to- 
gether, a few findings stand out. The net costs of resolving P&C insolvencies 
(scaled by  size) seem to be larger for small firms, poorly capitalized firms, 
firms writing significant amounts in long-tail lines, and firms that fail because 
of disasters. 
19. The robustness  checks of models 1 through 5 yielded the same basic results and are therefore 
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5.6  The Reason for Large Insolvency Costs 
Our findings raise the question of  why resolution costs are so high given 
that virtually all of  the insurance companies that fail are solvent, in terms of 
the book value of their capital, in the year before they fail. In this section, we 
briefly discuss potential reasons for our key finding that the costs incurred by 
guarantee funds in resolving P&C insurer insolvencies are extremely high- 
approximately 100 percent of preinsolvency assets. 
5.6.1  Assets, Liabilities, or Administrative Costs? 
In an accounting sense, there are three possible explanations for such high 
resolution costs. First, assets may be the cause; assets may fall sharply or be 
far overstated. Second, liabilities may be the cause; liabilities may  increase 
sharply or be hugely understated. And third, there may be very large adminis- 
trative, legal, and other costs associated with resolving insolvencies. Answer- 
ing this question definitively is beyond the scope of this paper. Nor do we have 
the necessary data to easily answer it; once a company is declared insolvent, it 
is removed from the NAIC database.  We suspect, however, that resolution costs 
are so high because failed firms drastically underestimated their (expected) 
liabilities-that  is, postinsolvency liabilities typically are about twice the size 
of preinsolvency reported liabilities.  We provide some evidence that is support- 
ive of this contention. 
Our main reason for suspecting that costs are high because liabilities rise 
sharply (except for the disaster-induced failures, this is probably because lia- 
bilities were previously understated) is that the other two possibilities seem 
unlikely. With regard to the administrative cost possibility, we do have some 
data for the eight states, mostly in New England, that are managed by Boston- 
based Guarantee Fund Management Services. Total administrative costs-of- 
fice, salaries, lawyers’ fees, and so forth-for  the eight state funds they admin- 
ister have averaged about $8 million dollars annually since 1991. These admin- 
istrative costs represent approximately 16 percent of the annual costs to the 
guarantee fund for these eight states. While it is difficult to know whether this 
number is unreasonably high, it seems unlikely that administrative costs ac- 
count for a significant portion of the large resolution costs that we estimate. 
The other possibility, that the large costs we estimate are associated with 
overstated or large decreases in assets, also seems unlikely. Approximately, 10 
percent of P&C assets is in the form of cash or other liquid assets, 60 percent 
is in bonds of  some sort, and 15 percent is in common and preferred stock. 
The remainder consists of  receivables and tangible assets such as the firm’s 
own buildings and data-processing equipment. While these assets can certainly 
fall in value, it is virtually impossible for them to fall enough to produce our 
resolution cost estimates. An example can illustrate why this is the case. For 
simplicity, assume that book assets are approximately equal to liabilities when 
the firm becomes insolvent (assets are actually higher, which makes our case 163  The Costs of Insurance Company Failures 
Table 5.12  Mean Change in Account in Annual Statements  Filed by Failed 




Change (n = 75) 
Total assets  -  1.28 
Total liabilities  14.48 
Loss reserves  18.65 
Losses incurred during year  26.03 
stronger). If liabilities do not change, and assuming away administrative costs, 
assets would have to fall to zero in order to produce resolution costs equal to 
the value of preinsolvency book assets. It seems extremely unlikely that assets 
fall to zero or anywhere close to that. A much more likely scenario involves 
increases in liabilities associated with huge (pre- and postinsolvency) losses. 
One piece of evidence for the view that problem liabilities rather than prob- 
lem assets cause insurance company failures is the fact that investment income 
is positive for the firms in our sample (averaging $3.6 million) in the year prior 
to  insolvency,  while  underwriting  income  is  negative  (averaging -$10.4 
million). 
In addition, to get a sense of how assets and liabilities change, we looked at 
the change in total assets, liabilities, loss reserves (a liability that estimates 
future losses), and losses incurred during the year (from the income statement) 
between one and2two  years prior to insolvency. The mean of the annual per- 
centage change for each of these variables is shown in table 5.12. The results 
are consistent with our expectations. In the year prior to insolvency, assets fell 
by only 1.3 percent while liabilities increased by  14.5 percent. Loss reserves 
and annual losses increased by  18.7 and 26.0 percent, respectively. It seems 
likely that the continuance of these trends, and not a sharp decline in assets, is 
what accounts for the large resolution costs of insurer insolvencies. 
5.6.2  A Comparison with Bank Insolvency Costs 
While insurance companies tend to fail because of rising (or previously un- 
derstated) liabilities, banks tend to fail because of  loan defaults. That is, to 
a first approximation, banks fail because of  asset problems while insurance 
companies fail because of liability problems. This fact makes our comparison 
of bank and insurance company resolution costs more than fair: because our 
cost measures are relative to preinsolvency assets (which are more likely to be 
falling sharply for banks), our finding that the ratio of costs to assets is much 
higher for insurance companies is even more striking. 
The large difference in resolution costs between insurers and depository in- 
stitutions may be due to differences in the nature of  the businesses of  these 
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smaller on average than the risks inherent to the insurance business, where the 
costs of production (policyholder losses) are unknown at the time the product 
is sold. In such a situation, bad business judgment or opportunistic behavior 
on the part of management can be particularly costly. Indeed, we find resolu- 
tion costs to be particularly high among firms writing large amounts of premi- 
ums in long-tail lines in which the value of future losses are particularly diffi- 
cult to estimate. In addition, the resolution cost differential between banks and 
insurance companies may  reflect differences in the way  that these financial 
institutions are resolved. While insolvent banks are typically liquidated or 
quickly merged with healthy institutions, insurance company assets are liqui- 
dated and the liabilities are assumed by guarantee fund management agencies. 
Essentially, insurance regulatory bodies operating through the fund manage- 
ment systems take over the insolvent companies and run them until all claims 
have been paid. 
5.7  Conclusion 
We examine the costs of resolving property-casualty insurance company in- 
solvencies. When a P&C insurance company becomes insolvent, solvent insur- 
ance companies are forced to pay assessments, which are a form of taxation, 
to state guarantee funds in order to protect the policyholders of the failed com- 
panies. Our estimates imply that the costs incurred by guarantee funds to re- 
solve insurance company insolvencies are remarkably high-about  100 per- 
cent of the book value of assets in the year before the company was declared 
to be insolvent. This implies that insolvent companies have liabilities that are 
approximatdy twice as large as their assets when they are declared to be insol- 
vent. These costs are more than three times as high as the costs incurred by the 
FDIC and FSLIC in resolving the failures of commercial banks and S&Ls in 
the 1980s. 
We also find that the ratio of net costs to assets tends to be higher for small 
firms, poorly capitalized firms, firms writing significant amounts of premiums 
in long-tail lines, and firms that fail because of  disasters. Our findings also 
indicate that the resolution of insolvencies is typically quick. More than 60 
percent of all costs to the fund for a given insolvency occur within two years, 
and more than three-quarters of total costs occur within three years. However, 
we find that firms with a high proportion of premiums in long-tail lines take 
much longer to resolve, perhaps because companies are gaming the solvency 
fund system, a type of moral hazard. 
Our findings raise a number of questions concerning the costs of resolving 
insurance company insolvencies. Although we have tried to shed some light on 
the subject, why the costs of resolving insurance company failures are soahigh 
remains something of a mystery. To what extent do the moral hazard effects 
created by the solvency fund system lead to the large costs? Are firms gaming 
the system by writing premiums in long-tail lines at below expected costs? Are 165  The Costs of Insurance Company Failures 
some companies writing high-risk premiums in geographically concentrated 
areas? Are the high resolution costs for insurance companies relative to banks 
the result of  the differing ways  in which these insolvent institutions are re- 
solved? Determining the reasons for the high cost of resolving P&C insurance 
companies is an important topic for future research. 
In addition, our finding of high resolution costs raises the issue of the extent 
to which the solvency funds are “exposed” to various shocks (e.g., natural di- 
sasters) that may lead to very large “assessments” against healthy firms. What 
scenarios would cause the solvency fund assessments to reach their maximum 
levels, typically 1 to 2 percent of  premiums per year? How exposed is the 
system to a very large shock or set of shocks that has the potential to create an 
S&L-like problem in  the P&C insurance industry? All of  these questions 
should have high priority in future research. 
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